As experts in labour law litigation, we have highlighted in various articles published in recent years the importance and generalization of proceedings for the protection of fundamental rights in the field of Social Jurisdiction, as well as additional compensation based on such violations (discrimination based on sex, age, disability, right to indemnity, as the most common) whose request is usually accumulated mainly in processes of null dismissal and terminations of Article 50 of the E. T. (serious breaches of the employer, usually in cases of moral or sexual harassment). T.S. (serious breaches by the employer, usually matters of moral or sexual harassment), although they can also be brought in any type of procedure regulated in article 184 of the Law on Social Jurisdiction.

Prior to analysing the Judgment of 27 February 2025, it is necessary to recall various previous judgments which confirm its doctrinal unification, including, most importantly, the Judgment of the Plenary of the Supreme Court of 26 January 2005, in which, accepting the doctrine of the Constitutional Court, it was stated that «although fundamental rights are not time-barred, this does not prevent the statute of limitations from operating with respect to actions intended to protect their violation when this is imputed to a specific person or entity, In other words, the Supreme Court has consolidated case law which confirms the existence of a limitation period for claiming the infringement of a fundamental right, which is the one-year period provided for in the Workers’ Statute.

In this sense, the Supreme Court refers to the ordinary legislation established in the Workers’ Statute and concludes that in the case of actions arising from the employment contract, the time limit established in article 59.1 of the Workers’ Statute is applicable; ‘Actions arising from the employment contract that do not have a special time limit shall expire one year after their termination’.

Well, based on this one-year limitation period, the legal doubt arose in cases of dismissal as to when does the limitation period start to run? Whether with the notification of the dismissal or when a court ruling declaring the nullity of the dismissal in violation of fundamental rights is declared final.

The Supreme Court in its ruling of 27 February 2025 resolves the legal doubt by referring to the provisions of article 1969 of the Civil Code, stating that the ‘dies a quo’ (or day on which the limitation period begins to run) begins on the day on which the action could be brought, i.e. in the case of dismissal, the day on which it occurred, and not the day on which there is a final judgment on the classification of the dismissal as null and void.

This legal clarification is important to consider in procedural terms when claiming compensation for breach of fundamental rights arising from a dismissal, because with this ruling, this right will expire if you wait to claim compensation for breach of fundamental rights once the judgement for null and void dismissal has become final.

In conclusion, at BELZUZ ABOGADOS, S.L.P., we consider it essential for the successful legal proceedings of this type of claims for violation of fundamental rights and the corresponding compensation in cases of dismissal, that they be made with the corresponding appropriate legal advice, not only with regard to the limitation periods explained in this article, but also with regard to the legal requirements for a correct presentation of the claim and the compensation to be requested before the Social Courts, for which we remain at your disposal from the Labor Department of BELZUZ ABOGADOS, S.L.P.